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The development of the Florentine silk industry:
 a positive response to the crisis 
of the fourteenth century*
di Sergio Tognetti
1. When we talk about the ‘crisis of the fourteenth century’, we are gener-
ally referring to a series of phenomena that have almost always been viewed 
as negative, especially when attention has focused on the evolution of the 
European economy: recurrent plague epidemics, starting with the one in 
1348, which led to a sharp reduction in the urban and rural population; fam-
ine; war; the abandonment of villages; the reduction or stagnation of agricul-
tural yields; the growth in wages and hence the cost of labour; the inability of 
urban economies to respond positively to changes in demand and consump-
tion, and so on.
There are obviously innumerable variants on this sketchy outline of the 
‘crisis’ in the various European contexts. It is now clear that the economic 
depression was felt more in continental than in Mediterranean Europe, that 
marginal areas suffered more from the drop in population and in agricultural 
yields, and that, in general, the economic structure of the more important 
cities managed to adapt to the drastic changes in the fourteenth century 
much better than the small and medium-sized urban centres. In many cases 
the fourteenth century was a period in which the gap in wealth between the 
various urban and regional economies widened, a period in which a kind of 
hierarchy of production, and thus an early embryonic international division of 
labour, was established.1
It is not accidental that the ‘crisis of the fourteenth century’ occurred in 
communal Italy (the north and central regions of the Italian peninsula) in the 
context of simplifying the general political situation. Through the political/
military subjection of a series of small and middle-sized urban centres, some 
large cities with republican regimes (as Venice and Florence) or under dy-
nastic rule (Milan under the Visconti and Ferrara under the Este) or absolute 
monarchies (Rome under the pope) no longer forged states on the basis of 
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urban centres but rather according whole regions. In this way they created the 
preconditions necessary for valorising better-integrated economies of scale, 
even if corresponding more or less to the needs and interests of the dominat-
ing city.2
An illuminating example of this is offered by the serious diffi culties faced 
by many Tuscan cities, such as Siena, Pisa, Arezzo, Pistoia, Prato and San 
Gimignano, which had once been prosperous centres for trading, banking and 
artisan activities. This was happening at a time when Florence not only re-
sponded in fi ne fashion to the crisis, but could also, thanks to its accumulated 
economic resources, afford to fi nance the growing costs of the wars it under-
took to annex much of Tuscany.3 This military conquest was accompanied by 
a series of economic policies to stifl e or limit the manufacturing industries 
of the subject cities under Florentine control. The wool and silk industries in 
particular – which were the most important and lucrative, the most export-
oriented and the ones capable of providing employment in broad sectors of 
the urban and suburban population – were effectively dismantled, or, in the 
best of cases, turned over to producing low-quality fabrics that did not repre-
sent competition for the textile industries of the capital. Certain niche sectors, 
on the other hand, were encouraged – shipbuilding and leatherworking in 
Pisa, the production of cotton fabrics in Arezzo, iron-working in the Pistoia 
area and papermaking at Colle Valdelsa.4
In the period when Tuscany (together with Italy and the rest of Europe) 
was affected by plague, famine and all the other factors we have already men-
tioned, Florentine primacy over the whole region was an incontrovertible fact. 
However, in the early fourteenth century Tuscany was still prevalently poly-
centric, not only from an economic but also from a political, artistic and cul-
tural point of view.5 Florence therefore took advantage of the ‘crisis’, or rather 
of the incapacity of the weaker and less fl exible economies of the other cities 
to respond effectively to the diffi culties of the second half of the century, to 
increase the gap between it and its rivals and ultimately to politically subject 
almost all of them. Naturally, all of this could not have happened if Florence 
had not in turn taken steps to adapt its economy to the rapid change in the 
situation and in international demand. One of the most macroscopic aspects 
of the ‘crisis’ was in fact the increase in the cost of labour, an inevitable conse-
quence of the drop in population and therefore of available labour, and at the 
same time the rise in the per capita wealth of the affl uent classes, an effect of 
the concentration of wealth in the hands of a limited number of individuals. If 
we equal out the money wage levels of masons, manual building workers and 
farm labourers in the period 1326–1348 at 100, it can be noted that the money 
wages in the period 1394–1430 were respectively 253, 299 and 307 (see Table 
1).6 The available data for textile workers and artisans are not, unfortunately, 
suffi cient to provide similar statistics; however the wages of the so-called 
Ciompi (wool workers) cannot have been all that different from what building 
workers and farm labourers earned; likewise the most skilled wool artisans 
must have earned similar wages to building masons. 
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The result was a reduction in low-quality, labour-intensive production 
and, conversely, the renewed vigour of activities relating to the manufactur-
ing of top-of-the-range goods where the high labour costs – inevitable if one 
wanted to fi nd specialized, highly qualifi ed labour – could easily be absorbed.
One aspect of the long-term conversion of the Florentine economy was 
undoubtedly the establishment, in grand style, of the silk manufacturing in-
dustry, which was directed towards producing fi ne fabrics to meet the growing 
demand for luxury goods on the European markets. Naturally, the silk indus-
try was only the most glaring aspects of a phenomenon that involved pretty 
much the whole sector of Florentine artisan manufacturing. Such develop-
ment would have been impossible if the bedrock structure of its economy – in-
ternational trade and banking, the privileged sphere of action of the so-called 
‘banchi grossi’ or merchant banking companies – had not survived.
On the other hand, a similar development also took place in Italy in cities 
like Lucca, Genoa, Venice, Bologna, Milan – all centres possessing a hardened 
squadron of merchant-entrepreneurs, ready to adapt themselves to the vary-
ing economic conditions and capable of instantly seizing opportunities offered 
by changes in international demand. But an analogous, though more con-
tained evolution also took place in many other urban settings on the Italian 
peninsula (I am thinking about capitals of seigniorial states such as Ferrara 
and Mantua, but also great capitals such as Aragonese and Spanish Naples), to 
the degree that during the Renaissance, Italy took on the aspect of a ‘zone pro-
ducing luxury goods’ within the larger panorama of the European economy.7
2. Prior to the Black Death, the population of Florence may have been up-
wards of 100,000 inhabitants, including the contado (the rural area under its 
jurisdiction) it was over 400,000.8 Given such demographic density, the ideal 
activity from all points of view was wool manufacturing. Throughout the pre-
industrial age, wool-working involved a large number of different processes, 
some of which (for instance, the preparation of fi bre for spinning) required 
a large, relatively unskilled workforce, while the fi nal dyeing and fi nishing 
phases were handled by skilled workers.9 Some processes were farmed out to 
rural workers; spinning, for instance, was generally carried out by women in 
the country villages and suburban areas.10 The natural consequence of all this 
was that labour costs comprised 60-65% of the overall cost of production for 
the Florentine wool workshops, notwithstanding the fact that the wool used 
in Florence was, generally speaking, high-quality (from England, for exam-
ple) and expensive.11 It is clear, then, that it was essential to keep labour costs 
down. Indeed this area of costs was the only one that could really be reduced, 
without, that is, resorting to the use of low-quality wool; however, this would 
have compromised competitiveness on the international marketplace.
The wool business also had the advantage of providing employment, di-
rectly or indirectly, to a large number of people belonging to the low and low-
er-middle classes, both in the city and in the rural villages adjoining the urban 
centre. In Florence in the 1330s, about one third of the urban population, 
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approximately 30,000 people, earned its living from the wool sector.12 In the 
decades of peak population levels, all the Italian communal cities adopted 
economic policies to encourage wool manufacturing. They had good reason 
to do so; in fact, it was the best solution both for redistributing wealth to the 
less well-off classes (and thus for stimulating internal demand) and for main-
taining public order by providing employment for the potentially dangerous 
masses.13
The Black Death and successive waves of epidemic decimated the 
Florentine population just as it did other Italian and European cities. By the 
time of the Ciompi Revolt in 1378, the population had fallen to about 55,000 
inhabitants. The fi gure obtained from the 1427 catasto was 37,000, a mini-
mum fi gure that was to rise only in the second half of the fi fteenth century. 
The same fate befell the contado, where the number of inhabitants dropped 
from around 300,000 at the beginning of the fourteenth century to 104,000 
in the 1427 catasto.14 Given this prolonged drain on the population, it was al-
ready a considerable achievement that the wool industry managed to produce 
9-10,000 pieces a year in the 1420s and 1430s, compared to about 30,000 
pieces in the early 1370s.15 During the same 50- to 60-year-period, in the face 
of a 30% drop in the city’s population, the overall labour force employed in the 
wool sector, if compared with the urban trades taken together, fell by 60%.16 
The strong growth in wages led to a benefi cial increase in consumption on the 
part of the humble urban classes, which had a considerable effect on the diet 
of the poorer classes and therefore on agricultural production in the country 
areas subject to Florence and controlled by city-dwelling landlords. However, 
the rise in labour costs had negative effects on the wool industry and drove 
many wool-manufacturers to employ workers on a piecework rather than an 
hourly basis. This was a response to the demands of a labour force that was 
much more expensive and harder to fi nd than in the past, and also much less 
willing to accept the impositions of employers.17
In such economic and demographic conditions, the best solution was 
to divert capital towards high-quality production using top-quality raw ma-
terials, where the labour costs would be fi tting remuneration for workers 
and highly specialized craftsmen, as was the case in the silk industry. Initial 
capital investment in the silk industry in the form of raw materials was deci-
sive. Indeed, although silk workers received considerably higher wages than 
their counterparts in the wool industry, the impact of labour costs on overall 
industrial costs was far lower. The decisive factor in raising production costs 
was the combined effect of the price of silk and the highly prized dyes, which 
taken together could amount to 65-70% of the industrial costs.18 Squeezing 
labour costs would therefore have been not only pointless, but also damaging. 
Indeed, it was risky to depreciate the work of qualifi ed workers, because they 
were the trade’s chief asset, and if they had gone elsewhere they could have 
favoured competition from other cities.
However, the shift to high-quality production could only be implemented 
if there was an extensive and experienced class of international-level busi-
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nessmen, accustomed to foreign competition and with expert knowledge of 
markets for sourcing the raw materials and for selling the fi nished goods. 
Naturally this socio-economic class also needed to be a fully fl edged part of 
the city’s governing class. This came about in Florence from the second half of 
the thirteenth century onward.
3. In the early fourteenth century silk manufacturing in Florence was just 
one of the many activities represented by the Arte di Por Santa Maria, the 
professional guild that, together with those of the Calimala (foreign cloth im-
porters-exporters) Lana (wool guild), Cambio (merchant bankers), the Medici 
e Speziali (doctors and apothecaries), the Giudici e Notai (judges and nota-
ries), the Vaiai e pellicciai (furriers) made up the seven main Arti Maggiori 
of the city. Besides protecting the interests of the setaioli – silk manufacturers 
and merchants – this corporation also represented a host of other trades rang-
ing from gold and silversmiths to the ritagliatori (retailers of wool, linen and 
cotton cloth), tailors, haberdashers, armourers, celonai (carpet and blanket 
traders), etc. No profession was regarded as being particularly more impor-
tant than the others, and the political weight of the guild was due precisely to 
the fact that it brought together such a vast and heterogeneous collection of 
modest entrepreneurial groups. The setaioli had neither a numerical or insti-
tutional preponderance, and even their profi le as organizers of the city’s silk 
manufacturing must have been fairly low-key.19
Things began to change in the second half of the fourteenth century, when 
the general economic and demographic factors we have already touched on 
were accompanied by an entirely contingent one – the emigration of entre-
preneurs and craftsmen from Lucca towards Genoa, Florence, Bologna and 
Venice. 
As is known, silk manufacturing in Italy (and throughout Europe, with the 
exception of the territories of the Byzantine Empire) originated in Lucca dur-
ing the twelfth century. Here, for the fi rst time, silk manufacturing had become 
a highly profi table activity, managed by the city’s rich merchant bankers, who 
exported their products to the major European markets. Lucca maintained a 
kind of monopoly on production almost until the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, jealously guarding the secrets of the trade and prudently ensuring 
that skilled craftsmen did not emigrate to other cities.20 In the second decade 
of the fourteenth century, however, the violent political confl ict between the 
Guelphs and the Ghibellines undermined the productive equilibrium of Lucca. 
Factional clashes, political persecution, condemnations to exile fi rst under the 
Ghibilline lordships of Uguccione della Faggiola (1314-1316) and Castruccio 
Castracani (1316-1328) and then under Pisan domination (1342-1369), led 
to the migration of Guelph silk traders and artisans towards the cities of the 
north and centre of Italy. These exporters of capital and conveyors of know-
how were welcomed with open arms, and frequently given tax incentives and 
various other kinds of economic assistance.21 The most macroscopic example 
is Venice, where there was a marked acceleration in silk manufacturing in the 
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second half of the fourteenth century thanks to the steady injection of entre-
preneurs, capital and skilled labour from Lucca.22
In Florence this all happened more slowly. Emigrants from Lucca general-
ly preferred to move away from Tuscany, and Venice offered more advantages 
than other cities. It was the major Italian market for oriental goods, including 
Persian and Chinese raw silk, and was well-placed to sell silk cloth both in the 
Mediterranean basin and in continental Europe. Furthermore, there was not, 
as in Florence, a powerful and fl ourishing wool industry.
It was not until the recession of the late fourteenth century that Florentine 
silk manufacturing began to move towards a new phase of development. 
Statutory reforms in 1404 and 1411 sanctioned the predominance of the gold-
smiths and setaioli grossi (the silk merchant entrepreneurs) in the Arte di Por 
Santa Maria, an unequivocal sign that it was gradually being characterized as 
an industrial corporation and a political manifestation of economic success.23 
In response to pressure from the leading silk entrepreneurs, in 1420 the guild 
began promoting gold-beating, incentivizing the immigration to Florence of 
skilled artisans from other manufacturing centres.24 This made it possible to 
produce, in Florence, the gold and silver gilt thread and leaf used to decorate 
and enrich silk cloth (here I’m thinking above all about brocade fabrics) des-
tined for a discerning clientele.
At the beginning of the fi fteenth century, silk manufacturing received at-
tention from the deliberative organs of the Florentine Republic and the pro-
tection and expansion of the new industry became one of the cornerstones of 
Florentine economic policy. There were four main areas of intervention:25 1) 
the incentivizing of the immigration of skilled labour, generally from Venice, 
Genoa and Lucca; 2) the impeding of the reverse process in all possible ways, 
by offering tax remissions, by freezing and cancelling debts, and even by de-
creeing the death penalty for anyone who emigrated to work in another city; 
3) the elimination of all competition within the Florentine state, effectively 
prohibiting silk manufacturing in the subject cities; 4) the promotion of the 
cultivation of mulberry trees and silkworm breeding in the Tuscan country-
side so as to be less dependant on expensive imported raw materials. Of these 
objectives only the last one was not fully achieved, despite some modest and 
partial success. Silkworm breeding only really became well-established in the 
modern age at the time of the fi rst Medici Grand Dukes.26
4. The catasti and city chronicles, company account books and records of 
contributions made by the Arte di Por Santa Maria to the charitable bodies 
they patronized (above all, the Spedale degli Innocenti) gives us quite a clear 
picture of the general evolution of the Florentine silk industry in the fi fteenth 
century. The overall picture is of marked growth, one might even say a boom, 
in the middle decades of the century.
The number of workshops of the setaioli grossi rose from 33 in 1427 to 50 
in 1461–62 (see Table 2). The only small dip occurred in 1480, but for entirely 
exceptional and contingent reasons that produced only short-term negative 
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effects.27 In addition, there were those of the setaioli minuti, who were a cross 
between an artisan and a retailer trader. They sold cuts of cloth and made rib-
bon, fringes, tassels, belts, sleeves, silk bags and various other haberdashery 
items. In 1427 there were 18 such businesses, by 1472 the fi gure had risen to 
24.28
The number of brokers in the Arte di Por Santa Maria doubled between 
1440 and 1461 from 10 to 20.29 The overall value of annual production rose 
from 233,000 fl orins in 1436-37 to 270,000 in 1451-53, 300,000 in 1461-62 
and 400,000 in 1490.30 At the same time there was a signifi cant increase in 
the number of gold-beating workshops, rising from an average of 10.7 busi-
nesses in 1461-70 to an average of 18.2 in 1491-1500 (see Table 3). There was 
a sharp increase in the manufacturing capacity of many companies, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms, and by the end of the fi fteenth century 
there was much less need to offer incentives to attract skilled craftsmen from 
elsewhere. Trained gold-leaf craftsmen and weavers of brocade and crimson 
velvet three widths of pile high were being turned out by the city’s numerous 
artisan workshops.31
While in Boccaccio’s Florence the large ‘proletarianized’ workforce made 
a living by working in the wool industry, the situation at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century had changed signifi cantly. In a letter dated April 9, 1513, 
Niccolò Machiavelli pointed out to his friend Francesco Vettori: “As fortune 
has seen to it that I should know nothing about the art of silk or wool manufac-
turing, nor of profi ts or losses, but that I am able to reason about the state, ei-
ther I must shut up or devote myself to reasoning about this”.32 It is interesting 
that ignorance of the basic, indispensable workings of a society entirely devot-
ed to business should make Machiavelli feel at a disadvantage, but what seems 
to me to be most remarkable is that silk should be mentioned fi rst in this short 
list of the city’s major entrepreneurial activities. Wool manufacturing had cer-
tainly not disappeared, indeed it was undergoing a new phase of prosperity,33 
but the city’s productive fabric was now strongly oriented towards the manu-
facturing and sale of top-of-the-range goods, including richly worked silk and 
gold-threaded silk cloth. The cost of labour had increased, but so too had the 
skills and professionalism of the workforce. As a result, Renaissance Florence 
did not return to the demographic levels of the early fourteenth century, given 
that the conditions for attracting the immigration of a large number of un-
skilled labourers no longer existed. Nor were there the social tensions that had 
culminated in the Ciompi Revolt in the fourteenth century. 
5. Success of such proportions would have been inconceivable if Florence’s 
wealthiest citizens had not taken an active and determinant part in the devel-
opment of Florentine silk manufacturing. 
They essentially contributed in three main ways. Firstly, they transferred 
a large slice of their capital towards the setting up of new silk enterprises, 
while in the past, if they had to choose a safe and profi table manufacturing 
sector in which to invest part of their liquid assets, they had always chosen the 
Sergio Tognetti8
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/2 <http://www.storia.unifi  .it/_RM/rivista/saggi/Tognetti.htm>
wool business. In 1438, the Medici family holding purchased a silk workshop 
and invested 4,200 fl orins. Management of the business was entrusted to two 
experts, who in turn invested a modest amount of capital, creating an initial 
overall sum of 5,000 fl orins.34 Another notable example is that of Tommaso 
Spinelli. After having been in the service of the large mercantile and fi nancial 
companies of the Alberti family as a general assistant and administrator, he 
became a prestigious merchant banker in his own right. In 1443-1447, Pope 
Eugenius IV nominated him depositario generale of the Camera Apostolica, 
in other words the leading papal banker. He was one of the major importers of 
Florentine cloth on the Roman market in the 1450s and 60s, and set up a silk 
business in 1454 with 6,000 fl orins of capital. Nor did the company fold when 
Tommaso died in 1471, but was kept going by his inheritors.35 Many other 
prominent noble families traditionally interested in large-scale commerce and 
international banking – Capponi, Corsini, Gondi, Mannelli, Martelli, Pitti, 
Portinari, Ridolfi , Salviati, Serristori, Strozzi and so on – threw themselves 
into the trade from the middle of the century onwards. They did not just invest 
in silk workshops, but soon became involved in gold-beating as well, which led 
to dual cost savings. The cloth manufacturing company no longer had to turn 
to the marketplace in search of gold thread and leaf with which to decorate 
their cloth, but simply used the sister company. The gold-beating workshop 
drastically reduced the cost of intermediaries to provide purchasers for their 
output, given that the majority of its business was conducted with the silk 
companies belonging to the same entrepreneur.36
The example of the Serristori family is particularly emblematic, given that 
the headquarters of the new silk manufacturing company set up in the middle 
of the fi fteenth century was the same one used in the previous decades to run 
an important and well-established merchant bank with a branch in Barcelona 
and numerous correspondents dotted around the main Mediterranean and 
European cities.37 Besides its silk manufacturing company, the Serristori also 
set up gold-beating workshops and a host of related activities, including a se-
ries of limited partnerships operating in Bruges and Lyons and, fi nally, a mer-
chant company operating in London.38 The considerable resources of the new 
Florentine setaioli and the extraordinary profi ts to be had in an industry that 
benefi ted from constant injections of liquid assets are evidenced by the follow-
ing straightforward data: between 1477 and 1491 the company capital of the 
Serristori silk manufacturing company rose from 5,333 large fl orins to 24,248 
large fl orins. The accumulated profi t between 1471 and 1492 amounted to the 
astronomic sum of 57,688 large fl orins (see Table 4).
In the second place, while fi nancial capital represented a powerful impulse 
for the development of Florentine silk manufacturing, a no less important role 
was played by human capital. The merchant bankers, accustomed as they were 
to operating on the international markets, had considerable knowledge of the 
centres for the supply of raw materials and possible markets for the fi nished 
products. Wide-ranging commercial brokering had always been one of their 
main areas of activity. Thanks to a well-established network of agencies and 
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foreign correspondents they could generally speaking predict when a market 
was becoming saturated or vice versa, when the prices of manufactured prod-
ucts, commodities and raw materials were going to increase or decrease, when 
interest rates were set to rise or fall. Joint ventures, maone trust companies 
and a whole mass of monopolist cartels frequently enabled them to come up 
with the best prices. They were also highly expert in transferring funds from 
one part of Europe to another by means of the bill of exchange. At the interna-
tional fairs of Geneva and then Lyons, which were fully fl edged international 
clearing houses, Florentine businessmen (together with many other Italian 
traders) held sway.39 It is no accident, then, that the Florentine silk traders 
channelled their most upmarket products not only towards the major capitals 
and commercial centres of the period but also towards the fairs of Geneva40 
and Lyons41.
In the space of a few decades, mercantile and banking capital on the one 
hand, and expert management on the other, revolutionized the structure of 
Florentine silk manufacturing. What in the past had been a skilled but quan-
titatively modest craft trade with relatively little entrepreneurial fl air, had 
become a strategic sector of the Florentine economy by the end of the fi fteenth 
century.
The third and fi nal factor is that the merchant bankers who engineered the 
boom in the silk industry in the fi fteenth century belonged to the same social 
class that managed and shaped the core features of the Florentine Republic’s 
economic policy. I have already outlined the main guide lines of this activity 
and the results achieved. I would simply like to add that at the end of the 1430s 
and the beginning of the 1440s, in an attempt to block the development of ri-
val competition in Siena, the Arte di Por Santa Maria, with the tacit support of 
the Florentine authorities, organized various plans to bribe Sienese craftsmen 
to fl ee to Florence after having set fi re to the looms. When this proved only 
partially effective, the Florentine corporation adopted the tactic of dumping, 
swamping Siena with Florentine cloth at rock-bottom prices.42
6. Between the end of the fi fteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Florentine silk industry was one of the most prosperous in Europe. 
Top-quality silk and gold-decorated silk cloth were sold in large quanti-
ties in Naples, Rome, Valencia, Lisbon, Lyons, Bruges, London, Antwerp, 
Nuremberg, Frankfurt, Leipzig, Budapest, Constantinople, etc.43 At the 
beginning of the modern age, fi ne Florentine fabrics — on a par with those 
of Genoa, Venice, Milan, Bologna, Lucca and so on — were one of the most 
important Italian export items. Thanks to foreign sales of high-quality goods 
such as silk cloth, the trading balance of Renaissance Italy was very healthy.44 
All of this was the result of a progressive adaptation to changes in interna-
tional consumption and demand following the ‘crisis’ of the fourteenth cen-
tury. Focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of goods was one of the 
objectives pursued and attained by the major urban economies on the Italian 
peninsula. This model of development was only to decline with the depression 
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of the seventeenth century. This really was tragic for the destiny of the Italian 
economy and society, both in terms of its intensity and the long-term negative 
effects that followed.
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Note
* This work was presented as a paper at the conference entitled Medieval Italy I. Transition and 
transformation in medieval Italy, c. 500-1500, organized by William R. Day Jr. (2-3 April 2003, 
Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge). The issues discussed here in a very conci-
se way are developed much more fully in Sergio Tognetti, Un’industria di lusso al servizio del 
grande commercio (Florence 2002). I would like to extend special thanks to Bill Day and his wife 
Fiorella for their generous and friendly hospitality during my stay in Cambridge.
1 As regards Italy in particular, see the acts of the conference Italia 1350-1450: tra crisi, trasfor-
mazione e sviluppo (Pistoia 1993), and also Michele Luzzati, ‘La dinamica secolare di un “modello 
italiano”’, in: Storia dell’economia italiana Einaudi, ed. Ruggiero Romano, 3 vols (Turin 1990-
91), vol. 1, 5-114, esp. 63-105; Richard A. Goldthwaite, Wealth and the Demand for Art in Italy 
1300-1600 (Baltimore & London 1993), 11-67; Reinhold C. Mueller, ‘Epidemie, crisi e rivolte’, in: 
Storia medievale (Rome 1998), 557-584; Franco Franceschi, ‘La crisi del XIV secolo e l’Italia’, 
in: Una giornata con Ruggiero Romano, 25 ottobre 2000, ed. Leandro Perini and Manuel Plana 
(Florence 2001), 13-22.
2 For a general approach to this topic, see Stephan R. Epstein, ‘Town and country: economy and 
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Table 1: Index of some money wages in Florence in the fourteenth and fi f-
teenth century.
Masons Manual building workers Farm labourers
1326-1348 100 1326-1346 100 1326-1347 100
1350-1369 239 1350-1369 264 1350-1369 219
1371-1393 226 1371-1393 269 1371-1393 278
1394-1430 253 1394-1430 299 1394-1430 307
1431-1470 247 1431-1470 285 1434-1469 334
1471-1500 216 1473-1500 268 1471-1500 269
Source: Sergio Tognetti, ‘Prezzi e salari nella Firenze tardomedievale: un profi lo’, Archivio Storico 
Italiano,  153 (1995), 263-333, esp. 333.
Table 2: Number of ‘setaioli grossi’ workshops
Date Workshops Source
1427 33 Edler de Roover, L’arte della seta, 62
1451-1453 34 Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, 156 a
1458 39 Dini, ‘L’industria serica’, 73
1461-1462 50 Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, 158
1472 49 Dei, La Cronica, 82, 126-127 b
1480 44 Bianchi-Grossi, ‘Botteghe’, 61 c
a Bruno Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria per l’arte della seta e l’economia fi orentina del 
Quattrocento’, in: Gli Innocenti e Firenze nei secoli. Un ospedale, un archivio, una città, ed. 
Lucia Sandri (Florence 1996), 153-178.
b Benedetto Dei, La Cronica. Dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 
1985).
c Maria Luisa Bianchi & Maria Letizia Grossi, ‘Botteghe, economia e spazio urbano’, in: Arti fi o-
rentine, 27-63.
Table 3: Number of gold-beating workshops in 1461-1500.
1461 10 1471 14 1481 10 1491 16
1462 11 1472 17 1482 10 1492 17
1463 12 1473 14 1483   ? 1493 20
1464 15 1474 11 1484 12 1494 20
1465 10 1475 13 1485 13 1495 18
1466   9 1476 12 1486 14 1496 18
1467   9 1477   8 1487 16 1497 17
1468   9 1478   7 1488 18 1498 20
1469   8 1479   9 1489 19 1499 20
1470 14 1480   9 1490 18 1500 16
Source: Bruno Dini, ‘I battilori fi orentini nel Quattrocento’, in: Medioevo Mezzogiorno 
Mediterraneo. Studi in onore di Mario Del Treppo, ed. Gabriella Rossetti & Giovanni Vitolo, 2 
vols (Naples 2000), vol. 2, 139-161, esp. 145, 152, 154, 157.
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Table 4: Details of the Serristori silk manufacturing company from 25 July 
1470 to 25 July 1492.
Date
Manufactured 
silk
(in pounds and 
ounces)
Cost of purcha-
sing and manu-
facturing silk, 
plus other costs 
(in large fl orins)
Sales revenue 
from the sale of 
fabrics and from 
other activities 
(in large fl orins)
Profi ts
(in large fl orins)
25.VII.1471 3331.06 10682.18.05 11941.00.11 1258.02.06
25.VII.1472 3229.05 9064.06.01 10782.10 1718.03.11
25.VII.1473 2847.11 7716.19.07 10010.11.06 2293.11.11
25.VII.1474 2900.07 7635.04.03 9169.01.05 1533.17.02
25.VII.1475 3497.01 9611.15.02 11037.09.08 1425.14.06
25.VII.1476 4575.10 12062.06.02 13629.16.03 1567.10.01
25.VII.1477 3877.10 12164.11.05 13823.11.04 1658.19.11
25.VII.1478 4777.02 13353.08.01 15187.18.11 1834.10.10
25.VII.1480 8257.10 22621.03.07 28689.04.06 6068.00.11
25.VII.1481 6474.01 15702.14.08 19335.07.01 3632.12.05
25.VII.1482 5866.06 14557.00.01 19016.07 4459.06.11
25.VII.1483 6249.02 16637.05.11 19849.04.02 3211.18.03
25.VII.1484 6357.07 15530.11.09 19127.18.08 3597.06.11
25.VII.1485 6739.04 15967.13.11 19218.10.07 3250.16.08
25.VII.1486 7146.07 17014.03 22023.19.11 5009.16.11
25.VII.1487 8059.05 19782.11 23390.04.05 3607.13.05
25.VII.1488 6743.03 17197.02.03 19933.17.01 2736.14.10
25.VII.1489 5499.08 14256.05.07 15346.14.10 1090.09.03
25.VII.1490 6493.05 13754.08.05 17701.13.10 3947.05.05
25.VII.1491 6439.02 15457.14.11 17128.08 1670.13.01
25.VII.1492 6172.02 16770.00.01 18885.07.02 2115.07.01
TOTALE 115535.06 297540.04.04 355228.17.03 57688.12.11
Source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Serristori, 595, fols. 6, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 
39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 55, 57, 58, 63.
